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 Abstract  ii 
Abstract 
Although Switzerland is not a EU-member country, in December 1999 the Swiss Parliament 
adopted the new Swiss Electricity Market  Law (EML). The EML laid the foundations for 
reforming the Swiss electricity industry by moving from regulation to deregulation. The Swiss 
population will vote on this issue in September 2002. If accepted, the deregulation process will 
be phased in gradually during a transitional period of seven years. This paper describes the 
Swiss electricity industry and shows how the federal structure leads to different regulation 
frameworks in each canton and municipality. Moreover, the paper sets out the most important 
characteristics of the law.  
In a second part, the paper focuses on the cost structure of the hydropower sector and gives an 
overview on the development of the production costs over the last decade. The paper shows 
that the cost structure of the producers has changed in the run-up to market deregulation. 
Further, the paper analyses the actual cost structure of the hydropower sector in Switzerland 
and shows the expected impact of the EML on the hydropower firms, especially on the 
competitiveness of the hydropower sector and on chances and dangers related to the 
deregulation of the electricity market.  
 Introduction  1 
1  Introduction 
In the last two decades many EU-member countries have implemented a full or, at least, a 
gradual opening of their markets into national legislation. This process has been generated by 
the obligation of the member countries to implement the European Electricity Directive 
(96/92/EC) by February 1998. Although Switzerland is not a EU-member country, the Swiss 
Parliament adopted the new Swiss Electricity Market Law (EML) in December 1999. However, 
this law has been submitted to a referendum.
1 Therefore, the Swiss population will vote on this 
issue in September 2002, and, in case of approval of the EML, the Swiss electricity market will 
be deregulated on January 2003. Of course, one of the most important arguments for the Swiss 
parliament to adopt the EML was to make Switzerland compatible with the EU-member 
countries which are, due to the geographical location of Switzerland, very important 
commercial partners in the electricity sector. In fact, Switzerland has always been a relevant 
partner in the European exchange of electric power. 
The EML laid the foundations for reforming the Swiss electricity industry by moving from 
regulation to deregulation. This change will be phased in gradually during a transitional period 
of seven years. 
This paper briefly describes the Swiss electricity industry and details the reform plans set out in 
the law. It also offers an overview on the competitiveness of the hydropower sector in the 
deregulated market. 
 
                                                             
1 Federal laws, generally binding decisions of the Confederation and State treaties concluded for 
an indefinite duration are subject to an optional referendum: in this case, a popular ballot is 
held if 50,000 citizens request so.  
The referendum is similar to a veto and has the effect of delaying and safeguarding the 
political process by blocking amendments adopted by Parliament or the Government or 
delaying their effect.  The Swiss electricity industry  2 
2  The Swiss electricity industry 
Switzerland is a modern federal state composed of 26 cantons and a pproximately 3000 
municipalities.
2 It has a population of about 7 million persons and is characterized by a high 
degree o f decentralization in the provision of public services.
   Article 3 of the Federal 
Constitution grants large autonomy to the single cantons and the municipalities in the sectors, 
which are not regulated directly by the constitution itself, among others schooling, roads, 
hospitals, taxation systems, and electric utilities. For instance, in the electric power sector each 
municipality has the autonomy to decide how to organize the electricity distribution on the 
own service territory. The typical solutions adopted by the Swiss municipalities in the electricity 
distribution are the following: distribution through a own public electric utility, distribution 
through a public utility owned by another municipality or distribution by a private utility. In the 
last two cases the electric utilities operate as franchised monopolies. 
2.1  Market structure 
The Swiss electric power industry is composed of about 1,100 public and private firms that are 
engaged in the generation, transmission and/or distribution of electric power. There is great 
divergence in size and activity among these companies. Generally, we can distinguish three 
types of electric companies. The first type is characterized by companies, which generate and 
transmit electricity. The second type is represented by e lectric companies, which primarily 
distribute electricity. Finally, there are companies, which are vertically integrated and thus 
perform all three electric power system functions. Table 1 presents an overview of the 
composition of the Swiss electricity industry.  
Table 1: Number of electricity companies in Switzerland 
Generation and/or Transmission  90 
Generation, Transmission and Distribution  140 
Transmission and/or Distribution  940 
Source: VSE, The Swiss Electricity Supply Industry Development and Structure, 1997. 
In the first group of companies we find also the so-called partner company, where shareholders 
can claim electricity production in proportion to their share capital. These partner companies 
are hydropower plants (storage) located in the Alps.  
In terms of numbers, utilities exclusively engaged in the distribution of electric power are 
dominant, accounting for 74% of the total. The majority of these 900 or so companies are 
municipal and provide power to their communities exclusively. The remaining utilities operate 
within urban or regional areas. Part of this group of firms is involved in generation, 
transmission and distribution, but generally the amount of generated power is small and is 
determined by the ability to exploit favourable hydroelectric power generation possibilities. 
There are few vertically integrated utilities, which generate a large amount of power. The 
municipal and regional electric utilities purchase power mainly from the 9 largest overland 
companies, which form the backbone o f the industry. These larger vertically integrated 
                                                             
2 23 cantons, 3 of which are divided into 2 semi-cantons for historical reasons. The most 
populated canton is Zurich with approximately 1.2 million inhabitants; the smallest is Appenzell 
Innerrhoden with little more than 15,000 inhabitants.  The Swiss electricity industry  3 
companies provide most of the generated electricity and are also involved in the transmission 
and distribution of electricity to final consumers and municipal utilities. Moreover, these 
dominant companies own and control the transregional and the international grids that are 
planned and used in close cooperation.  These companies are thus the relevant international 
actors in the exchange of electric power with neighbouring countries.  
The characteristics of the Swiss sector of electric energy generation are best illustrated with the 
aid of table 2.  
Table 2: Swiss electricity generation characteristics (2000) 








million of kWh 
Annual electricity 
production in % 
Hydro (Run-of-river)  3’570  20.8  17’566  26.9 
Hydro (Storage)  9’600  55.9  20’285  31.0 
Nuclear  3’200  18.6  24’949  38.2 
Thermal power plants and 
others 
790  4.7  2’548  3.9 
Total  17’160  100  65’348  100 
Source: Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik, 2000, Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Bern. 
The Swiss electricity sector is mostly based on hydropower generation (~58%) and on nuclear 
power generation (~38%). The production of electric power using thermal power plants  or 
using wind or photovoltaic energy is yet limited (~4%). The run-of-river hydro power plants and 
the nuclear power plants are principally utilized to satisfy the electricity demand at the national 
level during the medium and low load periods, whereas the storage and the pumped storage 
power plants are employed to satisfy the electricity demand during the high load periods. 
Around 80 of the largest power plants (hydro and nuclear) are organised as joint ventures 
(“Partnerwerke”) of the seven overland companies and some of the largest utilities owned by 
the cantons. This form of co-ownership was a successful way to share the risk of the long-run 
investments, which characterise the hydropower sector. 
The Swiss overland companies are very active in the exchange of electric energy with other 
countries. This exchange is shown in Figure 1. The figure illustrates a large net import of 
electricity from France and a subsequent large net export to Italy. Moreover, thanks to the 
relevance of the Hydro production capacity (storage and pumped-storage) in Switzerland, 
electricity can be imported at a favourable price from France at off-load periods by night and 
exported abroad, mainly to Italy, at peak load times. In Figure 2 we present the typical Swiss 
load curves over the course of a day for the national generation and consumption. The Swiss electricity industry  4 
 
 
Source: Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik, 2000, Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Bern. 
Fig. 1. Exchange in 200o of electric energy (net import and export) with neighbouring countries 
in TWh.  
The difference between these two variables gives us the amount of the Swiss net electricity 
export. This exchange of electricity with neighbouring countries over the day contributes 
significantly to the economic and financial results of the largest Swiss electricity companies. 
Therefore, during the last 20 years Switzerland has consolidated a position as European 
electricity peak producer and trader. Due to the advantageous geographical position between 
Italy, France, Germany and Austria, Switzerland is an active player in the European electricity 
markets. In total, the electricity trade volume corresponds to almost 170 percent of domestic 
consumption. 
The overland companies have established a market for exchange of surplus power based on 
short-term bilateral contracts. This is basically an inter-utility market for surplus production 
open only to a few companies. Since 1998, prices of this short-term trade are published in the 
Swiss Electricity Price Index (SWEP). The SWEP indicates prices in the short-term Swiss-
European electricity spot market. It is calculated on working days for working days and applies 
to the peak hour (11 am to 12 am). The Swiss electricity industry  5 
 
Source: Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik, 2000, Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Bern. 
Fig. 2. Typical Swiss load curves over the course of a day 
The structure of the electricity distribution sector is characterised by a great heterogeneity: The 
size of the Swiss electric utilities varies from very small municipal utilities selling 100,000 kWh 
(Kilowatt-hours) to large utilities selling more than 10,000,000 kWh. The 15 largest utilities 
account for approximately 50 percent of total electricity sales to end-users, the 100 largest 
utilities for 80 percent and about 1000 utilities for the remaining 20 percent. The average 
number of persons served by an electric utility is circa 6000. The Swiss electricity industry is, 
therefore, characterized by a small number of large electric utilities, which generate and 
distribute a high percentage of total sales of electricity and a large number of small public 
electric utilities, which essentially distribute electric power to their communities. 
Figure 3 illustrates the ownership structure of the Swiss electricity market. Private investors 
hold about 30 percent of the total capital invested in the electric power industry, whereas the 













Source: Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik, 2000, Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Bern. 
Fig. 3. Base capital structure of the Swiss electricity utilities. 
Switzerland’s electricity sector has experienced in recent years a slow, ongoing process of 
mergers and takeovers and therefore shows a higher concentration today. For instance, during 
the last years several private and public utilities created three large sale companies: Axpo 
(company created in eastern Switzerland), Swiss Citypower (company created by the most 
important electric utilities operating in the Swiss cities) and Avenis (company created in 
western Switzerland).  
As can be seen from figure 4 the largest Swiss generators (the seven overland companies EOS, 
ATEL, BKW, NOK, CKW, EGL, EWZ) are very small in comparison to the largest European 
generators. This picture allows us to make two remarks: First, the Swiss generators will not 
have the capability to i nfluence the prices on the European electricity market. Second, the 
current merger phenomenon and the high concentration in the generation of electric power at 
the European level may lead to a handful of dominant and potentially mischievous oligopolies. 
To contrast such an undesired situation the Swiss overland companies have created two co-
operations and commercial alliances groups: the West group composed by EOS, ATEL, BKW and 
the East group composed by NOK, CKW, EGL, EWZ. Moreover, some of these overland 
companies have some projects of alliances and potential mergers with foreign partners in their 

































Source: Company reports, 2000. 
Fig. 4. Comparison of the largest Swiss and a sample of European generators. 
Of course, if you consider also the sale activities of these overland companies the figures would 
be higher: ATEL (33 TWh), EGL (14 TWh), BKW (12 TWh), EOS (9TWh), EWZ (5 TWh), NOK (22 
TWh). However, these dimensions are still very small in comparison to the largest European 
companies. 
2.2  Regulation structure 
In Switzerland, the federal government, the cantons and the municipalities exercise legislation 
on the activities of the electric power industry. The federal government has the authority to 
license and regulate the construction and operation of all nuclear power plants, the 
construction of trans-regional grids and the exploitation of water resources for hydroelectric 
power generation. The cantons and municipalities regulate the activities of regional private 
and public electricity utilities. Only rough generalizations about their operations can be made 
because the federal structure leads to different ways of regulation. Some cantons regulate all 
utilities, while others limit jurisdiction to private utilities and leave regulation  of public or 
private utilities to the municipal authority. Regulation on the canton and municipal levels 
governs entry, quality and conditions of service, including the obligation to serve all customers 
in the assigned service area. Furthermore, electricity price changes by private electric utilities 
have to be approved by the Federal Price Surveillance Authority, whereas either the cantonal or 
the municipal public utility commission must approve electricity price changes by public 
electric utilities. In the latter cases, the intervention of the Federal Price Surveillance Authority 
is not always required.  
Concerning electricity distribution, the main policy options employed on the cantonal and 
municipal level are: the provision of electricity by a regulated public monopoly respectively by a 
privately owned but regulated monopoly. In e xchange for a guaranteed service to all 
customers, public and private electric utilities receive an exclusive territorial franchise. Thus, The Swiss electricity industry  8 
these utilities operate as local monopolies in their legally defined service territories and are 
protected from competition from other utilities offering the same service elsewhere. Of course, 
with the introduction of the new Swiss electricity market law, this situation will partially 
change. 
In practice the municipalities have the following two options when deciding how to provide 
their communities with electrical power. The first option consists of the attribution of the 
exclusive territorial franchise to a private utility, while the second one involves the attribution 
to a local or cantonal public utility. This self-governing process in the organisation of the 
distribution of electricity at the municipal level can explain the high number of municipal 
electric utilities in Switzerland. With the introduction of the new electricity market law the 
municipalities will still have the possibility to decide which utility will have the right to operate 
the distribution network on their territory.  
 
3  The Swiss Electricity Market Law (EML) 
With the introduction of the Electricity Market Law, the electricity sector of Switzerland will be 
reformed by moving from regulation to liberalisation of some parts of this industry. At the end 
of this process, all customers will be able to choose their energy supplier freely. The Swiss 
Electricity Market Law rewrites the rules that have traditionally governed all electricity-related 
activities in Switzerland. The basic principles of this law involve turning generation and 
retailing into competitive activities and allowing free access to the transmission and 
distribution grids, which will remain regulated a ctivities.  The general deregulation model 
adopted in the EML is a model of retail competition based on bilateral contracting. Under retail 
bilateral contracting, the actual distribution companies will be replaced by grid companies, 
which provide local distribution, and marketing companies, which purchase power from 
generators and sell it to customers. Marketing companies may or may not bundle their 
activities with distribution. Therefore, the Swiss proposal contains a system without an 
independent system operator (ISO) that operates a centralized spot market. 
The main characteristics of the EML include: 
1.  The abrogation of the local monopolies of supply. Consumer they will have the 
possibility to purchase electricity from a wide range of producers located in all parts of 
Switzerland as well in other EU-member countries using bilateral contracts. The local 
distributors will not have any more the monopoly of both retail sale and distribution 
activities, but only the monopoly of the distribution activities. Transmission and 
distribution are thus defined as local natural monopolies and, therefore, not subject to 
competition, whereas generation, wholesale and retail sale activities (trading activities) 
they are. 
2.  The principle of a regulated Third Party Access for all parties is the core element of the 
regulation of all transmission grids: national, regional and local. This is obtained 
through a mechanism in the law, granting so-called area concessions to grid owners. If 
technically possible, the concessionaires are obliged to allow access of other parties to 
the grid without discrimination. The access to the transmission and distribution 
network will be organised subject to a regulated third party access (TPA) model with 
point-of-connection (“postage stamp”) network prices. All transmission and distribution 
network owners will have the obligation to provide non-discriminatory access to the 
network. The Swiss Electricity Market Law (EML)  9 
3.  Tariffs for transmission and distribution are regulated and based on a model of point-
of-connection (“postage stamp”) network prices. These “postage stamp” network prices 
will vary among regions depending on the cost structure of the regional and local 
owner of the transmission and distribution grids.  
4.  As part of the regulatory reform, the high voltage transmission grid will be disinvested 
by the seven firms (Überlandwerke), which today control the national grid. The national 
grid will be organized as a private company with the function of an independent system 
operator (ISO). This company will also be responsible for balancing electricity demand 
and supply on the integrated transmission grid. 
5.  Separation accounting for generation, distribution/retail supply and non-electricity 
activities. T his will make easier to regulate the distributors and to avoid cross-
subsidization between the different activities of an electric company. 
6.  The creation of a new institution, the Arbitration Commission, as an independent 
agency with regulating and controlling activities of the transmission and distribution 
tariffs. Article 6 of the EML states that transmission and distribution tariffs should 
reflect costs of an efficiently operated network company. The actual discussions on the 
political level show a tendency to introduce during the first years of the reform a rate-
of-return regulation. This means that utilities are allowed to set tariffs that cover their 
operating and capital costs as well as a return on capital. However, Therefore, due to 
the fact that article 6 of the law contains also the idea of a benchmarking between the 
utilities, it is not excluded that in the mid term a yardstick regulation approach will be 
implemented. 
7.  With respect to the universal service obligation, the EML states that at the electric 
distribution utilities are obliged in their service territory to provide all users with a 
connection to the electricity grid and to apply uniform distribution tariff and ensure a 
good quality of the services. Thus, uniform distribution tariffs are not imposed at the 
national level.  Moreover, public service o bligations, which may relate to security, 
including security of supply and regularity are not included in the EML. Therefore, the 
determination of the electricity price, the security of supply, including the provision of 
reserve capacity is principally delegated to the market forces of the free competition.   
8.  To promote the development of part of the renewable energy sources (power plants 
with a capacity less than 1 MW; in the case of hydropower plants less than 500 kW) the 
EML states that this kind of energy sources can benefit from an exemption of network 
charges for a ten-year transition period. Moreover, in exceptional situations to deal with 
the problem of stranded investments, the hydro power plants can benefit from special 
financial loan conditions by the Swiss government. Therefore, the Swiss parliament did 
not decide to promote the development of renewable energy sources, either the small 
hydropower plants or the wind power plants, using the portfolio approach (in which a 
certain market share is reserved for renewables) or the approach characterized by a 
fixed subsidy for electricity fed back to the electricity grid.  
9.  The EML does not include privatisation processes as element of the regulatory reform.  
Therefore, the reform will not particularly affect ownership structure. However, at the 
local level there is a tendency to develop commercial entities through the 
transformation of the local utilities from companies organized within the domain of 
public authorities to stock company.  
10.  The EML includes liberalization of international electricity exchanges. Therefore, market 
players will be free to accomplish international electricity transactions trough bilateral 
short or long-term contracts. However, a safeguard clause in the law ensures that The Swiss Electricity Market Law (EML)  10 
access to the grid can be refused to foreign suppliers if the Swiss agents in the 
exporting country do not have the same capacity to enter contracts, as do their 
counterparts in Switzerland. In other words, the principle of reciprocity applies.  
11.  The EML allows qualified consumers to choose their electricity supplier. This element of 
the reform will be phased in. Table 3 shows how the retail market will be opened to 
competition, starting from 2003 a possible year of the introduction of the EML. The 
distribution companies will have in the first phase of the introduction of the reform the 
possibility to choose their electricity supplier for 20% of their supplies. Whereas in the 
second phase of the reform this share go up to 40%. After six years, the electricity 
market will be fully open to competition, which goes beyond the requirements of the 
EU electricity market directive. 
Table 3: A timetable for supplier choice in the Swiss electricity sector  
Size of qualified consumers  Year for supplier choice  Number of qualified 
consumers 
Consumption > 20 GWh  first 3 years  114 
Consumption > 10 GWh  4
th to 6
th year  250 
Consumption > 0  GWh  2009-.........  all consumers 
Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Bern. 
 
4  The cost structure of the Swiss hydropower industry 
Although at the moment it is uncertain when the new electricity market law will be in force, 
some fear that power prices in the next years will decrease and that this decrease could have a 
negative impact on the financial situation of the hydropower producers. In order to analyse this 
impact, the Swiss government and the Swiss Electricity Supply Association have commissioned 
some studies on the issue of stranded investments due to the deregulation process.
3 
In this paper, we employ another approach to analyse the impact of the EML on the 
competitiveness of hydropower firms. Our study is based on the comparison of the actual cost 
structure of a sample of hydropower firms with the expected market prices for the next ten 
years. In our analysis a firm is competitive in the short-run, and therefore, does not shut down, 
if the market price is equal to or higher than the minimum of its average variable costs.
4 This 
definition, considering that the majority of the Swiss hydropower firms will renovate their 
plants only after 2020, seems, from the economic point of view, appropriate.  
Our analysis is based on the assumption that the cost structure of enterprises will not change 
significantly over the next decade. This seems quite reasonable since in recent years - in view of 
market liberalisation  - important i mprovements in cost efficiency have been achieved. 
Operational costs (wages and maintenance) especially have been lowered. 
                                                             
3 Estimates of stranded investment of the electricity sector in Switzerland have been carried out 
for example by econcept (1997) and CSFB (1997) 
4 In this analysis, due to the very long run character of the hydropower investments, short-run 
means 5 to 10 years  The cost structure of the Swiss hydropower industry  11 
In addition, the potentials for capital cost reduction have been, as far as possible, exploited. 
Producers have carried out extraordinary depreciations, since they fear that in a liberalised 
market power prices will not be high enough to allow for an amortization of plants. Enterprises 
are largely unable to reduce interests’ payments on debt capital, since the capital market fixes 
interest rates. Consequently, it can be observed that interest payments vary according the 
development of i nterest rates, increasing during periods with high i nterest rates and 
decreasing when the interest rates fall. 
4.1  Dataset  
The analysis of the cost structure is based on a dataset containing technical and economic 
information for a sample of 46 producers
5. The dataset contains economic information derived 
from the annual reports of the producers for four years (1990, 1995, 1997, 1999), whereas the 
technical data are available for the year 1999. One major difficulty was to find meaningful 
criteria to allocate enterprises that generate electricity from several different types of plants to 
one specific hydropower category. 
For the analysis the following categories of hydropower plants were defined and allocation 
criteria used:  
1. Run-of-river hydropower producers (exploitable drop below 25 m): This category includes all 
firms that produce more than 50% of their power with run-of-river plants having an exploitable 
drop below 25 meters. These plants have no storage capacity and therefore have to produce 
continuously according to the river’s seasonal and annual flows. Run-of-river p lants with a 
small difference in elevation (less than 25 m) between water catchment and turbines are 
usually located along the large rivers in the flat parts of the country. Further, they generate 
power constantly over the year.  
2. Run-of-river hydropower producers (exploitable drop above 25 m): This category includes all 
firms that produce more than 50% of their power with run-of-river plants having an exploitable 
drop above 25 meters. This category contains mostly the run-of-river plants located in the 
mountainous regions of the country. Usually, these plants exploit the large altitude differences 
between the water catchment and the location of turbines. The water is usually led into 
pressure conduit systems. These producers often have problems with minimal flow 
requirements in the downstream reaches (between the point of water catchment and the 
release of the used water into the river). Their power generation is larger during the summer 
period (higher flows of the mountain’s rivers).  
3. Producers using storage plants without pumps: This category contains all firms that produce 
more than 50% of the power with “pure” seasonal storage plants. They are usually located in 
the alpine regions of the country. Their investment costs (costs per installed kW) are 
significantly higher than those of run-of-river plants. These additional costs are compensated 
for by focusing production on peak demand hours.  
4. Producers using storage plants with pumps: Firms assigned to this category use pumps 
whose capacity reaches more than 8% of the capacity of the turbines. The presence of pumps 
has an impact on investment costs (costs per installed kW). On the other hand, the water 
pumped in the reservoir during the off-peak period can be used to generate electricity during 
the peak-load periods, increasing the enterprise’s revenues. 
                                                             
5 From the original dataset we had to eliminate all those enterprises that are producers and 
distributors. At the moment it is not possible to discern the share of the costs of each activity.  The cost structure of the Swiss hydropower industry  12 
Table 4. Characteristics of the sample (data for the year 1999) 
Categories  # of firms  # of plants  ˘ Installed 
capacity MW 
˘ output in 
GWh 
Run-of river (drop <25 m)  8  9  52  308 
Run-of river (drop >25 m)  14  30  73  273 
Storage without pump  12  28  199  400 
Storage with pump  12  58  553  885 
Total sample  46  125  227  472 
Total Switzerland  311  525  45  110 
The sample includes 46 firms with 125 power plants. Considering that in Switzerland there are 
525 hydropower plants with a capacity of more than 1 MW, our sample includes about one 
fourth of all these plants.  
The figures in table 4 show that the average size of the plants considered (227 MW) is much 
higher than the Swiss average (45 MW, only plants above 1 MW capacity). Consequently, the 
average power generation of the plants is much higher than the Swiss average (sample: 472 
GWh; Swiss average: 110 GWh). In total, the sample plants generate more than 60% of power 
produced in Switzerland. Looking at the different plants’ categories, storage plants with pumps 
have the largest average capacity (553 MW) and annual generation (885 GWh). By contrast, the 
storage plants without pumps considered in the sample are considerably smaller (in average 
around 200 MW) and produce about half as much power as storage plants with pumps. The 
two categories of run-of-river plants have similar output levels, although some differences in 
their average capacity can be observed.  
4.2  Actual cost structure 
Fig. 5 shows the costs structure for the five categories of hydropower plants. The hydropower 
plants with a capacity between 1 and 10 MW have the lowest costs per kWh. Further, the run-
of-river plants have below-average costs. In contrast, the production costs of h ydropower 
plants with storage possibilities are above average.  The cost structure of the Swiss hydropower industry  13 
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Fig. 5. Production costs for different categories of hydropower plants (1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Over all categories, the variable costs of power generation  – wages, energy and other 
operational costs – amount to 27% of total production costs, while 46% are related to capital 
costs (interest payments, amortizations, and legal provisions). This share is higher for the high 
capital-intensive hydropower plants with storage, where this costs’ category is responsible for 
more than 50% of total production costs. Finally, 27% of overall production costs are related to 
water royalties and taxes. This share is higher for those plants with low operational and capital 
costs (i.e. plants with a capacity between 1 and 10 MW and run-of-river plants).  
4.3  Variable costs and output level 
In order to identify the factors decisive for the level of production cost of firms, it seems 
reasonable to look at the variable and the fixed production costs separately. We assume that 






















































































































Fig. 6.  Relationship between output and specific variable costs of production (labour, energy 
and other operational costs, 1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Fig. 6 illustrates the relationship between the variable production costs and the annual power 
generation (in GWh) for the five categories of hydropower plants. The level of variable costs 
varies considerably, between categories as well as between plants of the same category and 
with similar levels of production (see for example the variable production costs of storage 
plants with pumps). Within the same category of power plants variable production costs vary 
by a factor of two or more. These differences can be explained either by site-specific 
characteristics  - and thus differences in the maintenance of the plants  - or by different 
efficiency levels.  
Storage plants with pumps show decreasing variable costs with an increase in output level. For 
the other categories this relationship seems to be weaker. 
Given the small number of enterprises considered in each category, these results are to be 
interpreted carefully. In the next step of analysis we plan to carry out econometric analysis with 
a larger sample in order to identify more definitively the presence of economies of scale in 
production.  
4.4  Capital costs 
Investments in new storage plants or in enlargement of existing plants imply considerable 
investment costs (costs per installed kW). These can be compensated for either by an increase 
in the output level or by a change in the production pattern i.e. an increase in peak load 


















































































Fig. 7.   Relationship between capacity installed and specific capital costs (amortization, interest 
payments, dividends, legal provisions, 1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Fig. 7 shows the relationship between specific capital costs (sum of amortizations, interest 
payments, dividends and legal provision) and installed capacity.  
On the one hand, increasing capacity implies higher capital costs: investment costs (costs per 
installed kW), and therefore amortizations and interest payments, are positively related to the 
capacity installed. On the other hand, this cost-increasing effect can be partly offset by an 
increase in the production level.
6 Probably because of the small sample, it is difficult to identify 
clearly how capital costs vary with the capacity installed.  
Fig. 8 illustrates the development of specific capital costs according to the age of the plant 
(years since plant construction). As expected, specific capital costs are lower for older plants. 
This can be explained by the fact that a larger share of the value of the plant has already been 
depreciated.  
                                                             
6 One objective of an increase in the capacity installed can be an increase in production in peak 










































Fig. 8.  Relationship between year of construction and specific capital cost (amortization, 
interest payments, dividends, legal provisions, 1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
4.5  Comparison of the production costs with the expected prices 
In this part of the paper we compare the specific actual costs of the hydropower firms in our 
sample with the expected power prices for the next years (table 5, prices expected by Swiss 
producers). This comparison will show whether or not some firms from our sample will be able 
to cover their variable costs. From the theory we know that in the short run, hydropower plants 
will operate as long as electricity market prices cover at least the variable costs of production. 
Table 5. Forecast of electricity market prices (1 CHF = 0.67 €)  
Period  Peak (cts./kWh)  Off-peak (cts./kWh) 
2003-7  5-6  3-4 
Source: Econcept (1997) and information of Swiss electricity producers 
On the basis of our sample of 46 enterprises, it is possible to look in more detail at the 


























Fig. 9.  Variable specific production costs and average market prices of the enterprises in the 
sample (N=46), peak market price: 5.5 Ct./kWh; off-peak price = 3.5 Ct./kWh (1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Fig. 9 shows the variable production costs as well as the costs of taxes and water royalties and, 
as indicated by a thin line, the average market price of enterprises. We calculate the average 
price taking into consideration the production structure of enterprises. For storage plants we 
have assumed that production takes place primarily in peak periods and only secondarily in off-
peak periods. Run-of-river plants are not able to adapt production to the different load periods. 
Therefore we assume a constant production pattern across the day and the year
7. The output in 
each load period is priced according to its corresponding market prices (table 5). 
If we compare the expected short-run prices with the variable production costs (including taxes 
and royalties) we see that the great majority of enterprises will be able to cover at least their 
variable costs. Only those producers with the highest specific operational costs will have 
difficulty covering them.  
Since small plants (with capacities between 1 and 10 MW) have low operational costs they do 
not seem to incur such problems in the short run. The same holds for the storage plants with 
pumps. Although they have higher average operational costs, the prices they achieve are also 
higher than those of run-of-river plants. The other categories have only a few enterprises with 
variable costs above or near average prices. For a majority of enterprises, the difference 
between specific variable costs and prices is high enough to allow for small variations in price 
level or costs without having an impact on the short-run decision of whether or not to 
generate.  
                                                             


























Fig. 10. Total specific production costs and average market prices of the enterprises in the 
sample (N=46), peak market price: 5.5 Ct./kWh; off-peak price = 3.5 Ct./kWh 
Including the capital costs obviously dramatically changes the situation concerning the 
economic performance of enterprises.  
Although the specific costs in Fig. 10 could represent an upper limit of effective capital costs 
(due to e xtraordinary amortization carried out in view of market liberalization), several 
enterprises will not be able to cover their capital costs. Particularly among the capital-intensive 
storage plants with pumps, the forecasted market prices could imply important stranded 
investments.  
 
5  Conclusion 
The new Electricity Market Law will bring about a liberalization of some parts of this industry. It 
is expected  that in the short term, in a European market situation characterised by over-
capacities, power market prices will fall. As a result, some fear that Swiss hydropower plants 
will encounter economic and financial problems and, in the worst case, could be obliged to shut 
down.  
An analysis of the cost structure of hydropower plants and a comparison of the expected 
specific revenues with production costs yields the following conclusions:  Conclusion  19 
In the short run only a few producers will have financial difficulties covering operational 
(variable) costs. Therefore, the majority of the Swiss hydropower firms will not shut down their 
activities.  
Some firms of our sample present very high variable costs. We believe that these firms have the 
potential for optimisation and efficiency increases.  
In the short run several power plants will be unable to cover the full production costs. Capital-
intensive hydropower plants (plants with storage) will be particularly affected.  
In the long run, the competitiveness of the hydropower  sector will be d etermined by the 
capability of the producers to renovate, and therefore to re-invest in, their plants. The expected 
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